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Beginning with Max Weber, bureaucracies have been regarded as mechanisms that  
rationalize authority and decision-making in society. Yet subsequent theorists have 
questioned the rationality of bureaucracies. Which features of modern-day public 
bureaucracies are rational? Which are not? Buttress your argument with citations 
from organization and/or public administration theories. 
  
 
Introduction: 
Max Weber’s work about bureaucracy, translated into English in 1946, was one of 
the major contributions that has influenced the literature of public administration. 
However, Van Riper (1997) argues that the work of Weber on bureaucracy has no 
influence on American PA until the 1950’s. The word bureaucracy is derived from two 
words; “bureau” and “Kratos.” While the word “bureau” refers to the office the Greek 
suffix “kratia or kratos” means power or rule. Thus we use the word “bureaucracy” to 
refer to the power of the office (Hummel, 1998, 307). “Bureaucracy” is rule conducted 
from a desk or office, i.e. by the preparation and dispatch of written documents and 
electronic ones. Bureaucracy is borrowed by the field of public administration (PA) from 
the field of sociology. It was borrowed by PA in much a similar way that practices of 
business were borrowed from the field of business administration and economics. Weber 
(1946) presents bureaucracy as both a scientific and generic model that can work in both 
the public and private sectors (Rainey, 1996). For example, Weber asserts that: 
The bureaucratic structure goes hand with the concentration of the 
material means of management in the hands of master. This concentration 
occurs, for instance in a well-known and typical fashion, in development 
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of big capitalist enterprise, which finds their essential characteristics in 
this process. A corresponding process occurs in public organization (1946, 
221). 
 
This belief in science was evident in Max Weber’s rational-legal authority, which 
became the defining feature of organizational structures, especially government 
bureaucracies, to this day. It steered organizational setups to rational based 
considerations, which are in line with the science of administration idea. In other words, 
Weber’s bureaucracy consists of the traditional way of thinking in public administration 
that relied on the same “ingredients” to reform public administration based on the science 
of administration (Thompson, 2005).  
This essay explores the nature of Weber’s bureaucracy and its influence on the 
PA discourse. It explains the reaction to Weber’s concept of bureaucracy and its 
combustion with capitalist and democratic values. In addition, the essay reflects the 
rational and irrational areas that can be traced in the literature of public organizations and 
public administration theories. It concludes by presenting an objective view of 
bureaucracy and its implementing implications in a democratic society like the United 
States. 
Rationality of Weber’s Bureaucracy: 
Weber defines bureaucracy as “the means of carrying community action over into 
rationally ordered social action… an instrument for socializing relations of power, 
bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order.” Some scholars 
(Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941; Simon, 1947; Shafritz and Hyde,1997; and Marshall in 
Ventriss, 2000) argue that public administration is a field of control; control of public 
administrators, control of people, control of inputs, and control of outputs. All these kinds 
 3 
of controls seek to achieve one main goal which is to meet the people’s needs and 
expectations in an efficient way. According to Weber (1946), bureaucracy “is, from a 
purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is 
in this sense formally that most rational known means of carrying out imperative control 
over human beings” (337).  
Weber argues that human civilization evolved from primitive and mystical to the 
rational and complex stages and relationships. Weber believes that societies move from 
the primitive stage to theoretical and technical ones. According to Weber, the evolution 
of societies is facilitated by three types of authority that he identifies as traditional, 
charismatic and legal-rational authority (Fry, 1989). It is the legal-rational type of 
authority that constitutes the basis of Weber’s concept of bureaucracy and the foundation 
of modern civilization as it is premised on “a belief in the legitimacy of the pattern of 
normative rules and the rights of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands” (Stillman, 2000, 51). 
Since Weber argues that bureaucracy grows because of society’s needs of 
provision of education, health, social services, collecting taxes, and others, and therefore 
work has to be divided and specialized to achieve the things desired by the society. In this 
vein, Stillman (2000) quotes Weber stating that “[t]he proper soil for bureaucratization of 
administration has always been the development of administrative tasks” (Stillman, 2000, 
52). Key features of the ideal type of bureaucracy that Weber presents are division of 
labor, hierarchal order, written documents, well-trained staff and experts, full working 
capacity of the officials, and application of impersonal rules (Hummel, 1998, 307). 
However, these ingredients of bureaucracy may not, always, help organizations to reach 
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its ideal work or the most efficient performance. Michel Crozier (1964) argues that some 
of the bureaucratic characteristics including the impersonal rules, hierarchy, and 
centralization of decision-making might lead to the inability of the organization to correct 
or change its behavior by learning from its previous mistakes while serving the society.  
In fact, work within bureaucracy has to be divided rationally into units that can be 
undertaken by individuals or groups of individuals in a diligent manner. The hierarchical 
order is necessary for separating superiors from subordinates whereas impersonal rules 
are meant to ensure that bureaucrats are confined to prescribed patterns of conduct or 
performance imposed by legal rules. The rules are meant to facilitate a systematic control 
of subordinates by their superiors, “thus limiting the opportunities for arbitrariness and 
personal favoritism” (Stillman, 2000, 52). The operations of the bureaucracy “exclude 
irrational feelings and sentiments in favor of the detached, professional expert” (Fry, 
1998, 33). Therefore, one may deduce from the foregoing that Weber believes that 
organizational goals can be attained if there is a science of administration which separates 
facts from values. 
Moreover, Weber believes that bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient 
organizational form devised by man. Weber’s bureaucracy “is rational in that it involves 
control based on knowledge, it has clearly defined spheres of competence, it operates 
according to intellectually analyzable rules, and it has calculability in its operations” (Fry, 
1998, 32). In the same vein, Weber’s “[b]ureaucracy is efficient because of its precision, 
speed, consistency, availability of records, continuity, possibility of secrecy, unity, 
rigorous coordination, and minimization of interpersonal friction, personal costs, and 
material costs” (Fry, 1998, 32). 
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Domination is what Weber’s concept of bureaucracy is all about according to 
Brian R. Fry (1998) in Mastering Public Administration. It is a domination that “is 
exerted through administration” and “that legal domination requires bureaucracy for its 
exercise” (Fry, 1998, 15). Bureaucracy, states Fry, is Weber’s tool to express the most 
efficient and rational form of organization. By its essence, bureaucracy involves the 
element of control based upon the acquisition of specific types of knowledge. It is the 
efficient manner in which bureaucracy controls such knowledge that is its hallmark. 
Weber states about efficiency and bureaucracy that: 
Experience tends universally to sow that the purely bureaucratic type of 
administrative organization that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy 
is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest 
degree efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known 
means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior 
to any other form of precision, in stability, in the stringency of its 
discipline, and its reliability… it is the scope of its operations, and is 
formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks 
(Weber, 1947, 337) 
 
Rational decision-making is the underlying root to the success of bureaucracy. 
The ideal-type of bureaucracy, according to Weber, possesses rationally discussible 
grounds for every administrative act. Further, it dispenses equality in concept and 
application as well as establishing relationships based upon a sense of permanence.  
According to Weber, bureaucratic organizations operate “sine ira ac studio, meaning 
without a sense of bias of favor, relying solely on a professional decision-maker” 
(Rheinstein, 1954, 190-2). With such an emphasis on professionalism, there is a sense of 
a guarantee that rational objectivity is the order of the day rather than the personal 
choices of an arbitrary authority according to Weber.  
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We can critically assess bureaucracies as organizations with similar elements to 
the ones described by Michel Foucault (1975) in this book, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison. Are not the employees of public organizations taught certain methods 
and norms? Do not they follow specific rules, procedures and ways of performing their 
tasks? We see structures of societal institutions that remind us of the Panopticon; workers 
can see and can be seen. They are constantly supervised, analyzed, tested, and 
reprimanded for not following the norms. People sense that bureaucracy gets involved in 
every domain in their life and imposes its rational restrictions and sometimes the 
irrational ones, which are discussed in the next part of this essay. 
 Bureaucracy, Capitalism, & Democracy:  
 Weber generally implies that bureaucracy exists everywhere in a capitalistic 
society. Weber’s conceptualizations of capitalism and bureaucracy are “mutually 
supportive structures” (Fry, 1998, 33). Capitalism and bureaucracy require the same 
impersonal type of communication, one based on transactions that require legal and 
ethical behavior in order to perform successfully.  
 On the other hand, bureaucracy and democracy have a different type of 
relationship. It is that relationship which helps form the core of the intellectual response 
by the field of public administration to the integration of many Weber’s organization 
theory tenets. It is a relationship that is built upon influential statements by Weber and 
future analyses of his efforts on the subject by scholars in the realm of PA. Bureaucracy 
is the means for achieving rationally ordered social action. The question for public 
administrators is what happens if bureaucracy exceeds its bounds. First, let me offer 
Weber’s response to that question, which could be found in his thoughts on democracy. 
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Specifically, democracy of a special type is one where leaders are chosen to lead. On 
democracy, Weber writes: 
In a democracy people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the 
chosen leader says, “Now shut up and obey me.” People and party are no 
longer free to interfere in his business … Later the people can sit in 
judgment. If the leader has made a mistake – to the gallows with him! 
(Gerth & Mills, 1946, 6) 
 
Political leadership in a democratic framework is necessary for supremacy of the 
politics over the bureaucracy. This central issue is a prime concern for Weber as well as 
for the scholars of PA. “Passive democratization” is a process by which Weber describes 
that the bureaucratic elements control its democratic participants by controlling task 
completion. When there are too few control outcomes, there will be a danger of elite 
status or control groups, which becomes difficult to dislodge. Victor Thompson (1961) 
explains that bureaucrats sometimes adopt behavior patterns to dominate control over 
people by using their authority.  
The disconnection between professionals and citizens has been presented 
succinctly by Alexander and Richmond (2003) when they talked about the rigidity of 
rules and professionalism by stating that: 
In the context of governance by the elite in that it entails rule by the 
experts, the philosopher kings. As a result, governance by experts limits 
democratic process even further because professionals are inclined to 
determine right action through their professional training and science – 
which means they may be inclined to deny input or the validity of input 
from citizenry/people who may have a personal stake. The ethical 
dilemma that results is denial of the validity of people’s lived experience 
and how it can inform decisions that affect them (4).  
 
On the governance level and under the umbrella of rigorous scientific, rational 
view, why does bureaucracy conflict with democracy? Administration (bureaucracy) is 
about specifics rules, procedures, and getting things done while democracy is about 
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expression of will, participation, persuasion, and considering the voices of each citizen. 
But to come up with the democratic administration is not an easy mission because 
bureaucracy itself is the tool which is applied in the administration to get the work done. 
Bureaucracy itself is not democratic because it is based on hierarchy.  
Irrationalities/Limitations of Bureaucracy: 
Robert Merton (1952) criticizes Weber’s bureaucracy by observing that the 
bureaucratic features, which Weber believes in enhancing rationality and efficiency, 
might actually be associated with irrationality and inefficiency. Merton concludes that 
bureaucracy contains the seeds of its own destruction. This part discusses the 
bureaucratic model of Max Weber from a critical point of view. It focuses on four main 
irrational limitations that bureaucracy has in terms of its ideal type, its negligence of 
informal organization, and its dehumanization as well as its tense relationship with 
democracy. In particular, Weber’s bureaucracy does not consider the important role of 
the informal relationships that exist in any human organizations. In addition, many in 
public administration argue that the reality of bureaucratic discretion is a threat to 
democratic norms and practices that govern and rule the American community. 
Regarding the first limitation and through examining Weber’s bureaucracy 
carefully, Weber presents to us an idealistic and platonic model of bureaucracy that can 
govern and run the public system in any place and at any time. Weber (1946) uses 
expressions like: “fully developed,” “the pure type,” “most highly developed” or “purely 
objective considerations” which indicate that his model of bureaucracy is perfect and 
complete and it always functions effectively and efficiently. Having problems in the 
public performance and its inability to meet the whole citizens’ social needs and political 
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rights in any country negates the claim that the bureaucratic model is an idealistic and 
platonic system. Bureaucracy of Weber has not demonstrated that it is “fully developed” 
structure under the regular conditions in reality. Peter Blau and Marshall Meyer (1987) 
argue that “since perfect bureaucratization is never fully realized, no existing 
organization precisely fits the ‘ideal type’… [which] does not provide understanding of 
concrete bureaucratic structure” (25). In other words, it does not seem right for 
organizations to follow an ideal guide which may never be reached or may not work 
efficiently when it is applied. 
Even though if one argues that the ideal bureaucracy is only a conceptual guide 
for organizations to follow, it should be clear that this guide might be a misleading one 
because organization possesses “patterns of activities and interactions that reveal how 
social conduct is organized” (Blau and Meyer, 1987, 26). Blau and Meyer (1987) assert 
that “empirical studies have shown that this approach is misleading” (27). However, this 
essay emphasizes that the word “ideal” did not imply or mean “the best” or “what we 
should strive for.” Weber meant it as “defining characteristics” – that is, when we use the 
word this is what is meant. It is essentially a conceptual model of bureaucracy rather than 
something we thought that we should strive for. 
The second limitation that one can argue in regard to the bureaucratic model of 
Weber is the unawareness of the role of informal organization in affecting the efficiency 
of organization’s performance. Weber focuses mainly on the formal elements of 
bureaucracy such as specialization, rules, hierarchy, and others. On the other hand, the 
informal elements including human relationships, leadership, communication networks, 
motivation, and others were not given the attention that they deserve in the functions of 
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the public and private organizations as well. The existence and importance of informal 
organization, which is defined as “the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions 
and the associated grouping of people” (Barnard, 1966, 115), is highly accepted in the 
field of management. Barnard (1966) affirms that “informal organizations are necessary 
to the operation of formal organizations as a mean of communication, of cohesion, and of 
protecting the integrity of the individuals” (123). This importance of informal 
organizations is not seen in the bureaucratic model of Weber which focuses on formal 
structures only. Even though he talks about some social, political, or behavioral 
conditions of individuals in organization, his perspective emerges mainly from the 
framework of the formal organization.   
Thirdly, Ralph P. Hummel (2007) in his classic book, The Bureaucratic 
Experience (5th edition), argues that bureaucracy is getting worse in spite of all efforts 
exerted by the theorists of quality management, corporate reengineering, and the new 
public management because it is still “business as usual” for bureaucracies. He explains 
that bureaucrat becomes only a mechanistic technician who is detached from her/his 
humanity, emotions, society, and even her/his individual thinking describing it as “the 
bomb that threatens humanity.” He adds that bureaucracy replaces human identity, 
character, and autonomous will by the organization identity (Bodley, 2002, 75). 
Moreover, bureaucracy forces human to substitute her/his sense of right and wrong while 
performing her/his daily tasks by decisions, rules, and instructions imposed by higher 
supervisors who might be away from the real social context and its necessities. Hummel 
states that bureaucracy deals with human beings as cases rather than human beings who 
are in need for social and economic services stating that “[w]hat is a case? A case is 
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never a real person” (28). If the case meets the rules and laws of bureaucracy the case can 
be served. However, if the case does not meet the eligibility the case can be neglected 
even if it is worthy to be served from a human discretional point of view. Hummel 
announces that there is a conflict between society and bureaucracy and “all attempts to 
humanize relationships between a bureaucracy and society must therefore considered as 
suicidal or window-dressing when they come from within bureaucracy itself, and as 
declaration of war when they originate in society” (41). In other words, bureaucracy is 
blind, deaf, and dumb.  
The Application of Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society:  
From Waldo’s (1948) insight about the impossibility of really separating politics 
and administration, scholars of PA can infer that there is tension in the literature between 
bureaucracy and democracy. Regarding the fourth limitation, many American scholars 
have expressed their concerns that the reality of bureaucratic discretion is a threat to 
democratic norms and practices. For example, we do not know how bureaucracy 
functions in light of what both Blau and Meyer argue that “to protect ourselves against 
the threat of bureaucratic domination while continuing to take advantage of the 
efficiencies of bureaucracy, we must first learn fully to understand how bureaucracies 
function” (Blau and Meyer quoted in Lane, 1999, 8).  
 Blau and Meyer explain that Weber confessed that established bureaucracies are, 
at best, ambivalent toward democracy. “On the one hand, bureaucratization tends to 
accompany mass democracy. On the other hand, bureaucracies tend not to be responsive 
to public opinion” (Blau and Meyer quoted in Lane, 1999, 12). People ask all the times 
whether public bureaucracies can be controlled completely or not, according to Lane 
 12 
(1999). James Wilson (1989) clarifies that there are three ways in which political power 
may be gathered undesirably into bureaucratic hands:  
 by the growth of an administrative apparatus so large as to be immune 
from popular control, by placing power over a governmental 
bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public hands, or by vesting 
discretionary authority in the hands of public agency so that the exercise 
of that power is not responsive to the public good (Lane, 1999, 40).  
 
 Meier and O’Toole (2006) find that bureaucrats are powerful and can alter 
political programs to reflect their own values – they are strategic agents. James Q. Wilson 
(1989) argues that American bureaucracy is laden with rules, “that is a sure sign that the 
bureaucracy is aloof from the people, distant from their concerns and preoccupied with 
the power and privileges of the bureaucrats – an elaborate, grinding machine that can 
crush the spirit of any who dare oppose it” (Wilson, 1989, quoted in Stillman, 2000, 484). 
Due to the irreconcilable differences between administrative traditions and the 
impossibility of managing a modern society without bureaucracy, it is not surprising that 
scholars have had difficulty explaining the relationship between bureaucracy and 
representative government. The problems bureaucrats must deal with do not always fit 
into the hierarchy and authority based structures.  
Although McSwite (1997) lament the reluctance of people within the field of 
public administration to resolve the question of how bureaucracy fits into democracy, 
they are of the view that “keeping the question alive is essential to the identity that it 
wishes to maintain for the republic administrator – the power-wielding Man of Reason” 
(231). In other words, the more time we spend discussing the role of bureaucracy in the 
organizational development, the more the professionals or experts (bureaucrats) who 
 13 
dominate the decision-making process will continue to consolidate their position within 
the society.  
American liberal thought is a major source of frustration to those who seek a 
theoretical base that integrates democratic and bureaucratic theory. This tension generates 
a conflict between democratic and bureaucratic perspectives on governance and precludes 
an effective integration of the two. What seems clear is that the conflict between 
bureaucracy and democracy is steeped in “primordial controversy” (Rohr, 1986, 59-73). 
A discourse on the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy could provide guidance 
to administrators through a better understanding of the conceptual barriers to the 
development of a theory of democratic administration.  
The tension between bureaucracy and democracy leads the discussion to the 
issues of legitimacy of bureaucracy, power, discretion, and judgment in the field of public 
administration. Stivers (2001) states that 
This tension [between democratic governance and bureaucratic 
effectiveness] has made important topics of debate…Beneath these 
questions is the even more fundamental issue…how to make the power 
exercised by career bureaucrats consistent with the democratic 
government. It is assumed that modern government needs the expert and 
efficient action that bureaucracy makes possible. But a basic tenet of 
democracy, enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, is that public power 
ultimately comes from the people. How, then, does the bureaucracy make 
itself answerable to the people? (Stivers, 2001:159).  
 
 Bureaucracy is no longer considered a closed system since citizens can 
participate in the decision-making process through advisory boards, neighborhood 
council and others forms. In this vein, Wilson (1989) contends that the system has 
become irrational and inefficient. He bemoans this situation by stating that “this 
popular involvement would be taken as evidence that the administrative system is 
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no system at al, but a bungling, jerry-built contraption wallowing in efficiency 
and shot through with corruption and favoritism” (Wilson quoted in Stillman, 
2000, 484).  
 As a result of adherence to rules and openness to the public, Wilson 
observed that “public bureaucracy in this country is neither as rational nor 
predictable as Weber hoped nor as crushing and mechanistic as he feared. It is 
rule-bound without being corrupt” (Wilson quoted in Stillman, 2000, 484). He 
goes further by arguing that the governments of the United States were not 
designed to be efficient or powerful, but to be tolerable and malleable.   
Objective View on Bureaucracy: 
Trying to be objective as much as possible, neither democracy nor society will 
have chance to survive without bureaucracy because the latter (democracy) will not be 
able to carry out the programmatic promises of its elected leaders (Goodsell, 1994, 152). 
Waldo held that since democracy has long been accepted as the most appropriate form of 
government in America, it has served the “higher law.” The central issue of our time 
according to Waldo is that the potential conflict of bureaucracy and democracy are 
intimately joined. Bureaucracy to Waldo meant large-scale, formal, complex, task 
specialized, and goal oriented organizations. Democracy is characterized by values and 
ethics and it is not totally incompatible with bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, on one hand, 
supports democratic values and, on the other hand, has some conflicting characteristics 
such as hierarchy and discipline and supervision which conflict with equality and liberty. 
Waldo contends what we must accept that both bureaucracy and democracy are desirable 
and necessary and we should seek for an optimum mix between the two (Fry, 1989, 236).  
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Many researchers examine the assumption that democracy and bureaucracy are 
incompatible. However, they conclude that bureaucracies respond to local electoral 
politics in way that reinforces and improves democratic controls (Scholz & Headrick, 
1991, 829-850). The traditional view is that bureaucrats who are members of professions 
are especially adept at evading external controls because of their special expertise and 
ties to professional groups outside government. However, bureaucratic professionals 
often have no monopoly of skills or information, hold no homogenous values, and are 
subject to numerous checks. On the positive side, professionalism promotes bureaucratic 
responsibility and accountability through professional norms, as well as democratic 
decision rules, and provides “a Rosetta Stone for deciphering and responding to various 
elements of public interest” (Kearney & Sinha, 1988, 571-579). Moreover, we have to 
remember that some scholars in the field, including (Rohr, 1985), argue that bureaucrats 
have the legitimacy to rule based on the following rational justifications: 
1. They are competent, well- educated and trained and they do know things. 
2. They have long-term tenure which enables them to be experts in the details pf the 
public issues in contrast to the politicians who have a fixed period. 
3. Bureaucrats are from people and they enjoy the values and they have the good 
will to serve people and society. So they should be given the chance to rule and 
people should not worry. 
Conclusion:  
It has to be acknowledged that even though Weber believes rationality and 
efficiency can be attained through bureaucracy, he was mindful of its shortcomings as 
evidenced by the fact that he also associated it with “an oppressive routine adverse to 
 16 
personal freedom” (Fry, 1998, 33). He realizes that bureaucracy limits individual freedom 
and makes it difficult if not impossible for individuals to understand their activities in 
relation to the organization as a whole. Most importantly, bureaucracy favors what Weber 
called the “crippled personality of the specialties” (Fry, 1998, 33). 
Due to the irreconcilable differences between the administrative traditions that 
were presented by the founding fathers and the impossibility of managing a modern 
society without bureaucracy, it is not surprising that scholars within the field of public 
administration have so far failed to come up with an adequate theoretical base to explain 
the relationship between bureaucracy and representative government (Warner, 2001). The 
changes that have taken place within the American society make it clear that the 
problems administrators have to contend with do not easily fit the existing structure of 
hierarchy and authority based structure. Hence, the need to restructure or readjust the 
bureaucracy to adapt to new and complex problems becomes apparent. Unfortunately, 
there is no consensus regarding how the restructuring can be done and this issue will 
remain one of the hot debates in the field of PA for the coming decades.  
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